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ABSTRACT 
Boxing was legalized in California through a statewide 
referendum in 1 9 24 that s imultaneously set up a regulatory author ity 
with broad powers to control the industry. This s tudy examines the 
eco nomic performance of the boxing industry , the case for regulatory 
intervent ion, a nd the effect s of the specif ic kinds of regulatory 
rules that have been imposed . While regulation in Cal ifornia is 
widely believed to be an important factor explaining the unusual ly low 
rates of death and injury in boxing matches in the state, it is also 
shown to have a nt icompetitive effects . S everal changes in regulatory 
procedures are propo sed that would not reduce the extent to which 
regulation protects boxers ,  but would serve to e nhance the compet it ive 
performance of the industry . 
THE ECONOMICS OF BOXING REGULATION IN CALIFO RNIA 
Joel A.  Balbien, Roger G.  Noll and James P. Quirk 
Cal ifornia I nstitute of Technology 
Profes s io nal boxing in the United S tates has always operated 
on the fringes of respectab il ity . Early in this century boxing 
emerged from an activ ity that was illegal in mo s t  localit ies to o ne 
that was permitted, but o nly under co nditions of extremely 
comprehe ns ive regulation. The stated purpos e  of regulation was to 
protect against the evils that had led society to ban the spor t: to 
keep criminals a nd irrespo ns ible people out of the spor t in order to 
protect boxers from ser ious injury, a nd fans from f ixed f ights a nd 
uninteresting or gory mismatches . Thus , regulators were normal ly 
g iven the power to regulate co ntract terms between boxers and managers 
and between boxers a nd promoters , to overse e  matchmaking, and to 
co ntrol entry into the s port by l ice nsing everyo ne associated with it, 
including ushers a nd ticket -takers .  
Certainly the best known activ ities in the boxing industry are 
the matches involving champio ns a nd top contenders .  These receive 
nat io nal media attentio n  and produce huge receipts for everyo ne 
associated with them, including the boxers . But this is a fairly 
uninterest ing aspect of the industry from an eco nomic a nd regulatory 
point of view. These matches are arranged by the mos t  sophisticated 
people in the industry, are subject to fairly close publ ic scrutiny, 
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involve f ighters who are mo s t  able to protect their economic and 
physical wel l-being , and are subject to the forces of a competi tive 
market of international scope. The circums tances surrounding the 
backbone of the industry--the local boxing clubs at which boxers learn 
their trade and where the promising talents are separated from the 
"bums"--are far more obs cure and complicated . It is the latter part 
of the industry that is  the subject of this paper . 
The study focuses on the Cal ifornia boxing industry for a 
simple pragmatic reason. The California Athletic Co lIUllission (CAC) , in 
the midst of an internal reform, al lowed us to examine its records for 
the pas t  twenty year s .  Thes e  records included all contracts between 
managers and boxers and between boxers and promoter s ,  and all of the 
financial reports from professional matches that were licensed by the 
state during this period . In addition, the Commission encouraged its 
major promoters and managers to cooperate with our study, and as a 
result one of the nation' s leading promoters (and the only promoter in 
the United S tates s till running regular weekly boxing event s ) ,  Aileen 
Eaton, generously provided us with much additional information. 
Although the focus on California was not really a matter of 
choice , the s tate is nevertheless probably the most interesting one to 
s tudy . First , it is the largest boxing market in the country , in part 
because of its size and in part because of its proximity to Mexico . 
In the lighter weight divisions of profes sional boxing , Mexican 
nationals and Americans of Mexican descent are especial ly prominent . 
The large Chicano population of Southern California helps make the 
state the best market for these fights in the United S tate s ,  and , in 
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turn, the lighter weights account for mo st main event fights .  Second , 
the Cal ifornia Athletic Commis sion is reputed to be the mo st 
effective , least corrupt regulatory authority in boxing . For example,  
the incidence of deaths and s erious injuries in the ring is wel l  below 
average .  For these reasons , a study of California boxing is a study 
of the larges t ,  best managed part of the industry . 
HISTORY 
Regulation of boxing in Cal ifornia is as old as the industry . 
Professional prize fighting became legal in California with the 
passage of a s tatewide referendum in 1 9 24 .  The ballo t  measure 
authorized boxing and wrestling matches of up to twelve rounds for 
purses or where an admis sion fee was charged, and created a State 
Athletic Co lIUllis sion to license contests and participants . 
Before discussing the effects of regulation on the economic 
performance of boxing , it is interesting to review the arguments that 
appeared in the vo ter' s information pamphlet about the 1 9 24 bal lo t  
measure . Harry F .  Morrison, then As semblyman of the 29 th district , 
wrote the affirmative statement . He argued that boxing and wrestling 
were already legal and suc ces sfully operating in thirty of the forty­
eight state s .  In addition, records and s tatistics showed boxing to be 
safer than other major sports such as baseball and polo . Morrison 
continued:  "There is no athletic sport to which Americans contribute 
more enthusiastically than boxing contests • • • •  The audience drawn 
by promoters in Cal ifornia have been composed of the highest class of 
patrons . Lawyers ,  doctor s ,  merchants ,  bankers ,  minister s ,  public 
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officials and ladies have been interes ted spectat ors . "  At anot her 
point, Morris on adds : "It will not cost t he S tate of Cal i fornia nor 
the taxpayers a penny for out of the gros s receipts of the boxing and 
wrestling s hows t he s tate will take an amount sufficient not alone t o  
pay t he clerical expenses of t he c ommission ( t he c ommis s ioners receive 
no salary ) ,  but to provide for maintenance of a home for veterans of 
any wars of the U . S . "  He concludes wit h a patriotic appeal for a YES 
vote that will suppor t  U . S .  veterans w hile enabl ing fans w ho enjoy 
b oxing and wrestling t o  attend t hese sports . 
Writing a rebuttal was C hester H. Rowell, who was unidenti fied 
by trade . He argued that a twelve-round contes t  was a prize fig ht, 
and forbidding prize fights had l ong been t he official p ol icy of t he 
State of Cali fornia . Mr . Rowell c laimed that vigorous attempts were 
made in t hree consecutive legislatures to legalize prize fig hting . He 
writes : "But in spite of an active (not to say s hameless)  l obby, all 
three legislatures rejected t he proposal • •  Now despairing of the 
people's representatives ,  appeal is made t o  the people t hemselves.  Of 
course t he result will be t he same . "  Rowell que stions t he integrity 
of any future c ommis sion :  "The p owers of t his irresponsible, 
irremovhble commis sion are so exclusive t hat t he fighters and t heir 
promoter s will be e ffectively immune fr om inter ference by any other 
department of government . The governor has no means of disciplining 
the c ommission • • • the assessing of penalties is left s o  ingeniously 
t o  t he commis sion alone that it would be di fficult t o  get either 
fig hters or pr omoters into courts for anyt hing s hor t of murder • 
and t he commis sion aut omatically wil l be controlled by t he fight 
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pr omoters since the c ommis s ioners serve wit hout pay ( t houg h with 
unlimited expense al lowances )  and no one will accept the job on t hese 
terms . "  
In t he fifty years since t he passage of Proposition 7 ,  t here 
have been t hree major s tate and one federal inves tigations of boxing . 
In 1 93 9 ,  testimony by witnesses be fore t he Special As sembly 
C ommittee on At hletic Affairs r evealed monopolistic control of boxing 
and wrestling, as wel l as il legal and / or impr oper activities by 
industry participants . The trans cript s of the hearings suggest 
ine ffective regulation and improper conduct in concert with pr omoters 
by members of the S tate Athletic C ommis si on .  
The next major rep ort w a s  prepared b y  The Governor 's C ommittee 
on the Study of B oxing and Wres tling, and presents the findings of a 
series of investigations beginning in 1 95 5 .  The Governor's Committee 
gave special consideration to s eventy-two abuses and violations of t he 
rules , regulations and s tatutes, as wel l as ot her unethical or illegal 
actions uncovered in t he flurry of inves tigations . The report states 
that "these abuses and violations are not s omething of recent 
occurrence but many of them have been of long-standing during t he 
several adminis trations w hich have intervened since t he creation of 
the Athletic Commission • • • • " 
Fol l owing t he Governor's Report, a number of reforms were 
instituted to clean up s tate adminis tration of t he sport . 
Nonet heles s, in t he 1 96 0s t here was a massive federal investigation of 
boxing by Senator Kevaufer's c ommittee. The hearings and 
invest igations delved deeply into t he cr iminal aspect s  of professional 
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b oxing . One of the conclusions was that federal regulation was 
neces sary because incompe tence , lack of initiative, political 
pressure, and a desire to obtain profitable matches f or their s tates 
had crippled the abi lity of s tate commis sions to keep hoodlums out of 
the spor t .  Moreover, b oxing involved interstate and international 
c ommerce, weakening s tate regulation .  While the bill was being 
considered, the California S tate Legislature, the Los Angeles C ounty 
Board of Supervis or s ,  the San Francisco B oard of Supervis or s ,  and 
several other bodies pas sed resolutions calling f or its pas sage.  
Despite this apparent popular suppor t ,  S enat or Kefauver's  bill and 
similar House bills proposing federal contr ol of boxing never came t o  
a vot e .  
The most recent inve stigations of California b oxing began in 
1 972 , when the offices of the Att orney General and Governor 
investigated al legations of mis conduct by the staff of the California 
Athletic C ommission ( CAC ) as well as alleged "gate skimming " by a 
major promoter . While s ome evidence of que stionable conduct by CAC 
staff and a club was f ound, it was insufficient t o  provoke legal 
action by the Athletic C ommis si on, Att orney General ' s  office, Los 
Angeles District Att orney' s off ice, or the Internal Revenue Service . 
This is the f irst s tudy of b oxing in which regulation by a 
state c ommis sion is inves tigated in the c ontext of an economic 
analysis of b oxing . The regulatory functi ons of the CAC and their 
p ossible impact on market s tructure and c ompetitive performance are 
discussed . Empirical evidence of regulatory bias is also presented . 
The paper includes a discus sion of the manager-boxer cluster and a set 
of p olicy recommendations designed to increase c ompetition in the 
industry . 
AN ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF THE BOXING INDUSTRY
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The purpose of this section is t o  examine h ow the incentive 
structure of b oxing r egulation operates through the market t o  
determine the distribution of income in the industry among promoters , 
managers and boxers . It is easiest t o  understand the economics of the 
industry if we begin with the simplest cas e .  Later, w e  can add 
complications t o  move t owards a more real istic model .  
We begin by considering an idealized world in which there is  
no regulation of b oxing ; there are no entry barriers f or promoter s ,  
managers or b oxers ;  and the potential audience f or b oxing i s  
sufficiently large that there are a number of pr omoters c ompeting f or 
the s ervices of a large number of boxers .  
We as sume that boxers are not perfect substitutes f or each 
other in matchmaking . Each boxer can be imagined as l ocated in a 
space in which the dimensions measure his skil ls and other attributes 
that determine his b ox off ice drawing p ower . The boxers' labor market 
model proposed here is a continuous analog of the discrete 
categorization offered by S c oville in his ar ticle about players in 
team spor t .  As suming that the costs of c ol lecting and processing 
information are negligible, there is no neces sary r ole f or manager s .  
Promoters and boxers negotiate directly . Competition among promoters 
would raise b oxer purses to the point where each b oxer is paid his 
marginal value pr oduct ;  that is,  each boxer w ould be paid a purse 
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equal to the added revenue that a promoter obtains by p lacing the 
bo xer on the card . Free entry into promo tion means that promoters 
earn the going rate of re turn on their inves tment s in the indus try; 
there are no monopo ly profits for promo ters . And free entry into 
bo xing means that the least ski lled bo xer (or,  rather, the bo xer with 
lowest box office dr awing power) gets paid an income just sufficient 
to make it worthwhile for him to s tay in bo xing--at any lower income , 
he would prefer an a lternative job to a bo xing career . Boxers with 
skills and drawing power above minimum level earn economic rent; that 
is , they receive incomes in e xce s s  of what is  required to keep them in 
the industry. 
Suppose we now comp licate things somewhat.  In  particular, we 
adopt the realis tic assumption that searching out bookings and 
negotiating contract s with promoters are time-consuming jobs for a 
boxer, and that obtaining info rmation on the drawing power and/or 
bo xing skills of a boxer is a time-consuming job for a promoter . 
Moreover , assume that these informational activities require a certain 
amount of ski ll and have significant economies of s cale .  This would 
create incentives for the development of a specialized group of 
middlemen who act as employment brokers , mediating between promoters 
and bo xer s .  I n  the movie industry, these are the actors' agents; in 
bo xing , these individua ls are the managers . If there are economies of 
scale associated with specialization of the information co llecting and 
processing function, the manager can perform the services of 
emp loyment agent cheaper than either the bo xer or the promoter can . 
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A novel aspect of the employment market for bo xers (which 
applies to actors as well) is that the bo xer is hired for one event at 
a time , fo llowing which he is back on the job market .  I n  the absence 
of specialized booking agent s ,  a subs tanti al fraction of the bo xer' s 
time would be spent s eeking out employment and negotiating contracts . 
For this reason, the manager ( booking agent ) p lays a much more 
important role for a bo xer than employment agents p lay for the typical 
worker , providing recurring services over the client's entire working 
lifetime . 
The standard arrangement between managers and boxers is a 
long-term contract ( usually five years ) with income sharing . 1 In
virtually all California contracts one-third of the purse goes to the 
manager and two-thirds to the bo xer . The choice of a long-term 
contract with income sharing is of interest ( it applies in the case of 
actors as we ll) . In principle , a manager-boxer contract could be for 
just one or perhaps only several bout s ,  and it could be on a f lat fee 
basis per bout. There are many other po s sible variants , of course. 
Why is the long-term income-sharing arrangement adopted? 
To begin with, once a contract has been signed between a 
manager and a boxer,  there are advantages to the bo xer from an 
arrangement in which the purse is shared over one in which there is a 
f lat fee paid to the manager per bout . In es sence , sharing the purse 
provides s trong incentives for the manager to negotiate the highest 
purse po s sible for his f ighter. On a fee-per-bout basis,  the f ighter 
1 Both the duration and share are regulated , as discussed be low . 
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might find himself with numerous fights scheduled a t  minimum purses . 
Lnng-term contract s  can be justified on somewhat the same 
grounds . Most bo xers have a short career of only a few bout s .  There 
are both suppply and demand aspects to this . An inexperienced , 
unski lled bo xer has next to no drawing power, so the demand for his 
services is virtually nil at any positive price ; and if such a bo xer 
gets (and lo ses ) a f ew  bouts ,  the physical and p sychic punishment , not 
to mention the continued low pay that accompanies low drawing power , 
discourages him from continuing his bo xing career . 
Bo xing is a glamour profession to ghetto youths with dismal 
earning prospects in conventional occupations . The economic 
attraction of bo xing is that the f ighters who survive to r each the top 
make very high incomes .  This prospect keeps the inflow o f  new , 
inexperienced bo xers high , and their purses very low . For example,  
the standar d purse in Los Angeles for a preliminary bo xer is 
appro ximately $150 per bout , from which the boxer mus t  pay training 
e xpenses and the manager' s shar e ,  as well as o ther cos t s .  Moreover, 
bo xers rarely have more than one bout per month, so that the annual 
earnings -of a prelim f ighter are $1000 or les s .  Table 1 shows the 
earnings profile of California boxers for 1 97 6  and 1977 . 
The patterns for the two years are similar . Average bo xing 
earnings per bo xer were $30 22 in 1 97 6  and $341 5 in 1 97 7 .  Median 
income f igures , which give a better indication of bo xing earnings for 
a typical bo xer , are not available.  However , the data in Table 1 
suggest a median income that probably was less than $1000 in both 
years . Even taking account of the fact that bo xing is often a part-
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TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF BOXING EARNINGS 
CALIFORNIA BOXERS, 1976-1977 
1976 1977 
Annual Number of % of Avg. 1 Number of % of Avg. 
Earnin� Boxers Total Earnings I Boxers Total Earnings 
Under $ 2,000 315 78.8% $ 643 I 312 77.8% $ 638 
$ 2,000-$ 4,000 37 9.3 $2�615 I 50 12.5 $2,721 
$ 4,000-$ 6,000 14 3.5 $4,780 I 9 2.2 $4,580 
$ 6,000-$ 8,000 8 2.0 $6,675 I 3 .7 $7,083 
$ 8,000-$10,000 8 2.0 $9,170 I 4 LO $9,337 
$10,000-$15,000 5 1.3 $11,714 I 11 2.7 $11,425 
$15,000-$20,000 1 .3 $17,170 I 1 .3 $18,000 
$20,000 & over 12 3.0 $53,359 I 11 2.7 $71,899 
Total 400 100.0 $3,022 I 401 100.0 $3,415 
Source: Dan McGinn & Associates, Inc. (Memo, 1978). 
time employment , these are still remarkab ly low earning s for as 
demanding an activity as prize f ighting . 
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Annual earnings o f  $1000 t o  b e  shared by a pre lim bo xer and 
his manager lead to two conc lusions : ( 1 )  few individua ls , if any , 
would try to earn a living in bo xing for very long as s trictly pre lim 
bo xer s ,  even if managers' fees were ni l; and ( 2 )  few, if any , managers 
would find it economically worthwhile to perform booking services for 
such a bo xer , even if they were paid in e xcess of one-third of the 
purse.  This suggests that entry level boxers would be taken on as  
clients by managers only if  the contract were of long enough duration 
so that the manager could share in the big purses if a f ighter became 
succes sful, progressing up the line from prelims to main events and 
perhaps to championship bouts .  In such a long-term relationship there 
are advantages as well as disadvantages for the bo xer.  The major 
disadvantage of a long-term contract is that once the bo xer is 
successful, he no longer has the option of renego tiating his contract 
to lower the manager' s share,  even though , ex po s t ,  a manager would 
settle for a much lower fraction of a champion' s purse.  The major 
advantage of a long-term contract is that it provides incentives for 
the manager to develop the bo xer' s career in a manner so as to 
maximize the dis counted present value ( DPV) of the career earnings of 
the bo xer . With a short-term contract , a manager might e lect to 
overmatch a bo xer ear ly in his career to cash in on a big purse,  but 
in the process sacrifice the long-term interests of the boxer. With a 
long-term contract , the manager has an incentive to select matches for 
a fighter that provide mo stly victories , improve the bo xer's skills ,  
and increase the popularity o f  the bo xer with the fans . In the 
industry , this is called bui ldup . 
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An examp le of this s trategy is the career o f  former North 
American Bo xing Federation Welterweight Champion Pe te Ranzany, who was 
developed in Northern Ca lifornia exc lusively by Promoter Babe Griffin 
from 1 974 to 1 97 8 .  Ranzany' s career i llus trates how a s tring of low­
pay victories led to some bigger paydays later . Ranzany began his 
career as a main event fighter in Sacramento on Apri l  2, 1 974, with a 
record of 3-0 . He was paid $400 and attraacted 802 fans , a relatively 
poor turnout compared to that of two popular f ighters ,  Salinas and 
Mateo , two months earlier . This became the pattern for Ranzany as he 
dropped in and out of main event f light s ,  always promoted by Babe 
Griffin,  in Sacramento and o ther Northern California cities . His 
purse ranged from a low of $1 50 in March 1 97 5 ,  to a high of $750 late 
in the year . Ranzany continued to draw poorly at the gate unti l 
December 2 ,  1 97 5 .  With a record of 1 7 -1 and thirteen knock-outs , 
1 ,000 fans watched him defeat Ruben Vasquez . After this f ight 
Ranzany' s career took off . Between 1 97 6  and 1 978 he never drew under 
1 , 000 fans . Moreover , Ranzany's average purse for this two-year 
period rose to $5 ,7 60 per bout , compared to $369 per bout between 1 9 7 3  
and 1 97 5 .  
Even in the simple world we are considering , with many 
competitive promoter s ,  there are prob lems--major prob lems , in fact--in 
t erms of conf licts of interest between a manager and a bo xer . The 
prob lems s tem from the fact that managers have stables of fighters and 
are permanent members of the bo xing industry , with busines s  lifetimes 
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longer than the lifetime of a contract with any individual fighter . 
What this means is that managers will tend to make decisions with 
respect to an individual bo xer not simply in terms of the manager' s 
direct income from that boxer, but rather in terms of the way that 
such decisions will affect the manager' s income from all of the bo xers 
in his stable.  For example, if a manager has a high-ranking contender 
under contract, he might market package deals with promoters under 
which his contender f ight s  only if the card includes some other novice 
bo xer the manager is trying to develop . One way to think of this is 
that the manager is making choices so as to maximize his own DPV of 
income, which has a longer horizon date than doe s  that of any one 
bo xer under contract to him. The effect is to transfer income from 
current headliners to other bo xers under contract to the manag er . 
As long as a bo xer f ight s  under a contract that was signed 
before he achieves widespread popularity, the quasi-rent generated by 
a superior boxer is transferred in part to the manager, perhaps to 
some degree outside of the bo xer' s purse.  Managers will tend to use 
this market power to benef it themselve s ,  even at the expnse of the 
boxer, until the contract expires and mus t  be renego tiated in a 
competitive situation. Thus ,  if a manager has a high-ranking 
contender or champion under contract, he is in a better po sition to 
further the interests of young potential contenders than is a manager 
without a contender under contract . But this means that the DPV of 
income from the young potential contender is higher to the manager 
with a contender already under contract than to another manager . 
Hence, there will be a tendency for managers with contenders or 
champions to buy up the contracts of the best young potential 
chal lengers from o ther managers; the syst em  tends to perpetuate 
itself, with the same managers in control of the best f ighters over 
time . 2 The only escape is for a boxer to al low several managers to
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bid f o r  the right to manage him after the contract expires . Because 
bo xing careers are short, this usually occurs near the end of a 
succes sful career, so that even for the mo s t  talented boxers,  this is 
l ikely to be a weak check on the ability of managers to e xtract much 
of the earnings potential of the best bo xer s .  
Finally ,  w e  add one further compl ication t o  the picture. Thus 
far, we have assumed that boxers and managers face a large number of 
promoters who bid competitively for bo xers . Of course, in practice 
things are no t quite l ike this . Even in large metropolitan areas such 
as Los Angeles, there are only a handful of promoters who put on 
bo xing event s and almost  all of them restrict their activities to jus t  
one o r  two shows per year . In Los Angeles, only one promoter --Aileen 
Eaton at the Olympic Auditorium--presents weekly bo xing shows . 
Indeed, this is the only ongoing weekly operation in the U . S. This 
suggests that there are barriers to entry into promoting, and it is 
wel l to consider jus t  how such barriers might persi s t .  
I n  general terms, natural barriers to entry are present i f  a 
market can support only one or perhaps at most a few f irms of 
efficient s ize; that is,  an efficient size firm is  large relative to 
2 An alternative to buying the contract of a young potential
contender is to nego tiate a deal under which there are co­
managers for the boxer, sharing the manager' s income . 
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the market .  Natural barriers t o  entry arise mo st often when there are 
signif icant indivisibilities in production, such as a piece of capital 
equipment which cannot be s caled down to handle small rates of output . 
In the bo xing industry there are indivisibi lities that make 
for natural barriers to entry in promoting bo xing matches . To begin 
with, to reach ef ficient ( low-co st)  staging of bo xing shows, an arena 
of a certain minimum size must be rented . Moreover, there are set-up 
costs for an arena that is used for o ther events (baske tball, hockey, 
ice shows, conventions , and so forth) that can be bypas sed if the 
arena is specialized to bo xing and wrestling . In o ther words ,  there 
are co s t  advantages to constructing a permanent ring and permanent 
seating for bo xing and wrest ling in an arena used for these sports on 
a regular basis,  as compared to use of an arena for bo xing one night 
and conversion to some o ther purpose following the bout . 
But perhaps an even more significant indivisibility is the 
specialized skill of an e xperienced, full-time bo xing promoter . There 
is a type of natural monopoly in promoting to the e xtent that there 
are signif icant cost and r evenue advantages that can be obtained by an 
individual who knows the marke t intimately from both the demand and 
the supply side, who has nego tiated with the various managers over 
long periods of time , who is familiar with the use of the media in 
promoting and marketing bo xing , and who is aware of the ins and out s 
of regulation of bo xing . 
We have no direct evidence relating to the co sts of deve loping 
a trained promoter nor to how many such promoters can be supported by 
a large metropolitan area . However , there are only a handful of 
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full-time promoters in California, and there is specialization even 
among these ( s ome promote regular weekly or monthly cards invo lving 
mainly local bo xers ,  and others promote occasional championship cards 
invo lving boxers with international reputations ) .  It appears that the 
natural barriers to entry in the form of specialized arenas and 
specialized promo ting ski lls p lay an important role in restricting 
entry into promo ting . 
There are other barriers to entry as well relating to risk 
aversion on the part of manager s .  The argument is simi lar t o  that 
which ho lds with respect to life insurance .  An individual buying a 
life insurance policy is understandab ly concerned that the company 
supplying the po licy wi ll not go bankrupt by the time the po licy comes 
due; so individuals tend to buy life insurance from o ld, e stab lished, 
large companies, and it is difficult for a new company to break into 
the field .  Managers who p lan t o  spend a lifetime in the bo xing 
industry are aware of the fact that natural barriers to entry limit 
the number of promoters in a locality. Any new entrant into promo tion 
in an area faces the prob lem that unless  he can establish himself as a 
viable long-run competitor to e xis ting promoter s ,  it is not in the 
interest of managers to book their boxers on his cards, even if the 
purses are substantially higher than those being offered by o ther 
promoters . The prob lem is that the manager must balance the short­
term gains to hims e lf ( and his bo xers)  with the threat of long-term 
los se s  if the new promo ter fails .  Even if the manager i s  not subject 
to retribution by the surviving promoter, the momentum of the "build­
up" of his best f ighters can be lo st if the new promoter fails and the 
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manager cannot immediately work them into the matches of the o ld 
established p romoter. It is  not necessary that there be any overt 
agreement between an established promoter and e stablished manage rs to 
s queeze out any incipient competitive p romoter; astute manage rs will 
be wary of p lacing bo xers with a new promoter simp ly by fo llowing 
their own self-interest.  The result is  what a re called "cluste rs "  in 
the indust ry--groups of manage rs who wo rk p rimarily with a sing le 
promoter for many years through succe ssive ca ree rs of multip le 
generations of bo xers . 
C lusters a rise f rom mutual self-interest.  Both the p romoter 
and the manage r  s tand to gain f rom develo pment of local talent in such 
a way as to maximize the boxe r' s drawing power. As noted earlier, 
building a long st ring of victories can occur through astute choice of 
opponents who a re s cheduled over time so a s  to develop the bo xe r' s  
ski lls a s  we ll a s  t o  provide victories.  One of the p rob lems , however, 
is  that the incentives are strong enough that shortcuts in the form of 
f i xed f ights can occur--and in fact there are numerous instances of 
these cited in p revious investigations of bo xing in Califo rnia .  But 
even when f lagrant violations such as this are not present , there are 
a lways potential difficulties when a manager, who se job is to 
negotiate with a promoter fo r the best deal fo r his fighter, f inds a 
mutual sharing of interest with the promo ter. For one , the "build-up" 
of one f ighter requires a s t ring of f ights in which the opponent is 
highly like ly to lose.  Normally the opponent' s manage r  will be 
prescient enough to know that his fighter is hardly the one being 
built up . The p romoter will want to encourage cooperation with the 
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build-up process , and can b e  expected to use his o r  he r local monopo ly 
position as a device for insuring that promising loca l talent gets 
transfe rred ( through contract sale s )  to the "right" manage rs .  This 
will p rovide a continuing source of local ta lent for development and 
cannon fodde r fo r tho se being developed . 
The presence of c lusters is shown in Table 2 .  This shows the 
tendency of each of the thirteen majo r manage rs in the s tate to 
concentrate his f ighters in a particula r  location. People in the 
industry interviewed for this study cited Aileen Eaton' s O lympic 
Bo xing C lub and its affiliated managers ,  in particular Jackie McCoy 
and Benny Geo rgine, as an example of a succes sful bo xing "cluster. " 
McCoy' s and Georgino' s f ighters a re among the highest paid 
nonheavyweights in the world ,  and Tab le 2 shows tha t ,  indeed, they are 
closely associated with the O lympic . 
Whi le the concentration of matches th roughout the state that 
involve particular managers at specific clubs is impres sive,  it might 
be exp lained by natural ba rriers , such as the residential proximity of 
managers and fighters to promoters and thei r minimal earning power, 
rather than a tendency towards a naturally anti-competitive practice . 
Therefore a mo re detailed analysis of the Southern California market 
was conducted . Table 3 illust rates the segmentation of the Southern 
California market for boxers . The large diagonal e lements suggest 
that the va rious c lubs are drawing bo xers f rom segmented labor pools , 
as predicted by the c luste r model. 
MANAGER 
*Jackie McCoy 
*Benny Georgina 
J. Cabrera 
Norman Kaplan 
Tony Gomez 
Rudolph Tellez 
Antonio Buena 
Mario Silva 
Fred Merino 
TABLE 2 
PERCENT OF TOTAL FIGHTS AT ONE CLUB 
FOR 16 ACTIVE CALIFORNIA MANAGERS 
1976 and 1977 
IDENTITY OF 
PERCENT AT PRINCIPLE 
SAME PROMOTER PROMOTERS 
85 Olympic 
68 Olympic 
67 Olympic 
79 Olympic 
80 Olympic 
57.1 Olympic 
54 Olympic 
67 Olympic 
44 Olympic 
Santiago Montoya 45 Olympic 
Serjio Ojeda 42 Olympic 
Norman Lockwood 50 Olympic 
Frank Dobales 50 Stockton 
Gene Campbell 40 Garden City 
Pat Difuria 65 Fresno 
Frank Cloud 27 Fresno 
* California managers with highest earnings. 
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PROMOTER'S 
% OF TOTAL 
STATE BOUTS 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
42. 
4.3 
8.1 
2.2 
2.2 
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TABLE 3 
MOBILITY OF BOXERS WITHIN 
THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIGHT MARKET 1978 
CLUB I 
Olympic San Diego Forum 3 Star 
Olympic 83.0 26.6 30.0 15.0 
San Diego 15.6 67.0 15.0 55.0 
CLUB II 
Forum 2.8 2.4 65.0 5.0 
3 Star 1.4 8.9 10.0 45.0 
% All Southern Calif. 65.0 23.0 6.0 6.0 
Bouts 
Entries in columns are the percentage of fighters who fought at that arena 
who also fought at location listed in the row. Last row is the fraction 
of all bouts in S outhern California that were fought accounted for by 
each promoter. Diagonal elements are the percentage of fighters at each 
location who fought only for the club. 
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EARNINGS OF BOXERS 
As shown in Table 4, almo st 80 percent of al l bo xers earn les s 
than $2000 per year in bo xing , and only about 5 percent earn over 
$10,000 per year . Moreover, data in the table overstate the true 
California bo xing earnings of boxer s ,  for earnings as shown are gros s  
o f  training e xpenses and manager' s share.  Almo st a l l  bo xer-manager
contracts provide for a one-third manager' s share,  so that earnings 
going to bo xers are actually at least one-third less than those shown 
in the table.  Taking $6000 per year as a "minimum wage" income ( it is 
roughly the annual income from 40 hours of work per week at the 
minimum wage) , it turns out that only about thirty boxers in the state 
earn this minimum wage income net of manager's share. Needless to 
say, for most boxers ( upwards of 90 percent ) ,  boxing is a part-time 
occupation. 
In 1976, the top 3 percent of all boxers ( that is , twelve 
bo xers ) accounted for 5 3  percent of all all bo xing earnings ;  in 1977, 
the top eleven bo xers (2.8 percent of the total) earned 57 .8 percent 
of all bo xing income . Actually, these data understate the disparity 
in earnings among boxers , because those bo xers in the h ighest earning 
group so far a s  Cal ifornia boxing earnings are concerned also 
typical ly earn subs tantial amounts from boxing out s ide the s tate, 
while boxers in the lowes t  earnings groups tend to be booked into 
local clubs only . 
These data support the fol lowing conclus ions : 
1. The economics of bo xing makes a permanent bo xing career
Annual earnings 
of no more than 
$2,000 
$4,000 
$6,000 
$8,000 
$10,000 
$15,000 
$20,000 
$20,000 & more 
TABLE 4 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMBERS AND EARNINGS 
CALIFORNIA BOXERS, 1976-1977 
Cumulative 
% of boxers 
78.8% 
88.1% 
9 1.6% 
93.6% 
95.6% 
96.9% 
97.0% 
% of boxers 
3.0% 
1976 
Cumulative 
% of earnings 
16.7% 
24.7% 
30.3% 
34.7% 
40.8% 
45.6% 
47.0% 
% of earnin!:\s 
53.0% 
Cumulative 
% of boxers 
77.8% 
90.3% 
92.5% 
93.2% 
94.2% 
96.9% 
97.2% 
% of boxers 
2.8% 
Source: Dan McGin & Associates, Inc. (Memo, 1978). 
1977 
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Cumulative 
% of earnings 
14.5% 
24.5% 
27.5% 
29.0% 
31.8% 
40.9% 
42.2% 
% of earnings 
57.8% 
very unattractive if a fighter does not reach a very high level of 
accomplishment . 
2 .  Only a small number of boxers --about a dozen in 
California--are sufficiently skilled to earn attractive incomes . 
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3. Boxing is really not a very important sport economically .
In 1 980 , baseball star Pete Rose earned $800 ,000 , which is  more than 
the net earnings ( after subtracting managers' shares) of all boxers in 
California in 1 97 7 . 
4 .  The c luster mechanism exis t s ,  and i s  the means by which an 
uns table ,  risky situation for boxers is trans lated into a stab le 
stream of earnings for managers and promoters . 
THE ROLE OF REGULATION 
The California Athletic Commis sion' s major regulatory 
functions can be sunnnarized as ( 1 )  licensing participants ,  ( 2) 
licensing shows through contest approval and supervision, ( 3) 
enforcing and supervising contract s ,  and ( 4 )  collecting taxes . These 
regulatory roles and their economic impact will be described 
s e quentially .  
LICENSING 
Licensing controls the entry of c lubs , boxers ,  managers , 
matchmakers , referee s ,  s econds --even cashiers and box office 
personnel--into the industry . The stated purpose of licensing 
participants is to prevent uns crupulous persons from doing business in 
California and to provide a means of suspending the operations of 
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thos e who violate state laws , engage in improper conduct , or endanger 
themse lves by participating in matches . Licensing fees also provide 
revenue s which support Connnis sion operations . The number of 
licensees , license revenue s ,  and measures of the scope of boxing 
activity from 1 962 to 1 97 8  are shown in Tab le 5 .  
In evaluating licensing , a central is sue is whether it reduces 
competition. E xamination of the s tate' s major boxing markets on a 
comparative basis shows relatively litt le competition everywhere,  but 
some differences among citie s .  For e xample , comparing the Los 
Ange les -Long Beach area to the San Francis co-Oakland marke t during 
1 965-77 reveals simi larities in the small number of f irms but 
differences in the intermarket mobility of promoter s .  Over the 
twelve-year period ,  f ifteen firms operated for at least one year in 
the Los Ange le s-Long Beach area , while twenty clubs were licensed in 
the much smaller San Francisco-Oakland area . Moreover , while Los 
Ange les c lubs rarely promoted events in more than one city or 
location,  some San Francisco c lubs typically promoted in three or four 
Northern California cities or arenas . Yet both the San Francisco­
Oakland and Los Ange le s  markets appear to have been dominated by one 
or two major c lubs , accompanied by two or three minor promoters . 
Superior in San Francisco operated unti l  1 97 3, while the Olympic in 
Los Angeles has continued to run weekly shows for over thirty years . 
For somewhat smaller citie s ,  such as San Diego, Sacramento and 
Stockton, only one or two c lubs seem to be able to survive . Although 
cost data, now unavai lab le , would be required to prove it , 
similarities and differences between markets sugge st that the extent 
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TABLE 5 
BOXING TIME. SERIES -- 1962-1971 
Ma
·
,ch March June June June June June June June 69-70 70-71 64'...65 65-66 66-67 67-68 68-69 62-63 63-64 
Clubs 86 Bl 63 68 79 
95 80 69 73 
Prof. Boxing Clubs 5 21 19 18 15 14 20 
Managers 243 207 169 167 211 220 244 248 265 
Matchmakers 10 11 8 8 11 15 20 6 10 
Wrestlers 141 139 113 115 157 143 150 174 190 
Boxers 460 387 272 263 392 401 508 468 499 
Wrestling Booking Agents 2 2 2 3 2 6 4 5 6 
Boxing Attendance 269,564 195,676 125,508 177,155 357. 789 325,229 417,974 443,262 407,871 
Wrestling Attendance 745,057 671,110 413, 768 441,442 636,071 639,670 688,263 649,436 785,156 
Closed Circuit Attendance 
Shows Held, Boxing 196 161 100 103 173 180 203 189 202 
Shows Held, Wrestling 649 691 498 463 580 563 623 609 677 
Closed Circuit Shows 
Gate Recipts, Boxing 1,062,008.88 524,601.57 327,939.94 470,982.19 1, 278, 132. 27 1,597,763.5 1,996,283.00 2,628,183.50 2,141,961.00 
Gate Receipts, Wrestling 1,434, 777 .86 1,262,258.14 781,160.42 812,268.04 1,256,449.20 1,283,350.70 1, 479 ,211. 21 1,631,859.95 1,847,894.50 
Closed Circuit Receipt 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
BOXING TIME SERIES -- 1971-1978 
June June June June ·!/ June June -�/ June l/ 
Category 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76 76-77 77-78 
Clubs 101 108 75 69 97 77 83 
14 16 17 17 13 12 Prof. Boxing Clubs 18 
Managers 269 220 203 205 246 252 275 
Matchmakers 13 11 7 8 8 9 18 
Wrestlers 185 169 191 203 188 219 174 
Boxers 545 472 425 443 522 465 520 
Wrestling Booking Agents 4 7 6 6 7 4 4 
Boxing Attendance 392,915 413, 980 357,052 352,152 324,261 287,838 322,126 
Wrestling Attendance 814,474 648,141 621,016 550,264 620,585 592,896 558,004 
Closed Circuit Attendance --- --- --- 133,107 152,217 104,853 24,213 
Shows Held, Boxing 185 171 166 173 188 160 175 
Shows Held, Wrestling 719 629 678 582 577 597 601 
Closed Circuit Shows --- --- --- 116 101 62 25 
Gate Receipts, Boxing 2,110,238.00 2,592, 745.25 1,694,368.50 2,130,574.00 1,830,666.95 1,891,519.25 2,369,551.00 
Gate Receipts, Wrestling 2,138,020.00 1,822,762.25 1,853,065.50 1, 712 ,653.00 1,973,542.55 1,865,601. 75 1,812,997.00 
Closed Circuit Receipts --- --- --- 2,336,498.00 2,254,662.50 1,606, 730.50 227,885.00 
Total Expenditures of CAC 171,260 210,596 248, 718 264,687 314,640 342, 148 373, 704 
"!_/ There were two conflicting sets of data for 1974-1975. 
];/ Karate Attendance 12,919, $95,294.50 for ten shows. 
]_/ Karate Attendance 2,015, $7,212.00 for five shows. 
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of the demand for boxing, scale economies as sociated with access to 
permanent arenas ,  and the scarcity of promotional skills limit the 
promoter field in a city to no more than a handful of clubs . While 
locational licensing mo st likely reinforces and s tabilizes market 
concentration, the cros s-sectional data point to some degree of 
natural monopo ly. 
In bo xing, licensing fees are quite low: $10 for bo xers, $50 
for managers , and $200 for promoters for each location at which the 
promoter is licensed to stage contests . Considering the apparently 
insignificant income earned by the majority of bo xing participants, it 
is no t surprising that even these fees may reduce the number of 
licensees in the industry. For e xample, consider the manager who 
usually receives a maximum of one third of a boxer ' s  purse.  In view 
of the small earnings of mos t  boxers , even $50 may be a major drain on
earnings for a manager who wants to develop a young f ighter . Thus it 
is not surprising that Mexican nationals who box in California often 
have unlicensed managers at home . We know of no practical method for 
dete rmining whether the fee is an important source of this phenomenon, 
but the difficulty of enforcing a licensing requirement across an 
international boundary and the lower average incomes in Mexico are 
factors that make this a likely effect . 
In order to test s tatistically whether s tate licensing fees or 
other factors acted as barriers to entry of new bo xers,  managers,  and 
promoters we performed a multiple regression analysis using data from 
Table 5 to calculate real industry revenue, real s tate licensing fees,
and the annual number of licensees . As can be seen in Tab le 6 ,  with 
TABLE 6 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE NUMBER OF LICENSEES 
1962-1977 
Independent 
t Boxers Managers 
Time 8.02 3.3 
(2 .43) (2. 47) 
Real Boxing 8.2(10-5) 2.5(10-5) 
Revenues (2.87) (2. 21) 
Real License -14.11 -3.08 
Fees ( .86) (2.32) 
Adjusted R2 .56 .56 
t t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
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Promoters 
-.3(10
-1) 
(.095) 
.17(lo-5: 
(. 7) 
-.27(10
-1: 
( .4) 
-.19 
the important exception of managers , license fees were not a 
statis tically s ignif icant fact or in e xp laining the variation in 
licensees acros s time . However, the s ign of the regress ion 
coeff icient was negative , as expected , f or all participant s .  The 
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level of real b oxing revenues was a s tatis t ically significant variab le 
at the 5 percent level f or both boxers and manager s .  The coef f icient
als o  had the anticipated positive s ign. Ne ither s tate licensing fees 
nor real revenues e xp lained the variance in the number of boxing 
promoters active in a g iven year . This result is c onsistent with the 
hypothesis s tated earlier that s ignif icant natural barriers to entry 
may e xis t f or California boxing promoters . 
Nevertheless ,  boxing promoters argued that the annual $200 
licensing fee t o  promote a t  a specif ic arena within a city of greater 
than 100 ,000 in p opulation is a s trong d is incentive f or pr omoters t o  
try different locations within the same marketing area or in nearby 
c it ies. If this is so, one effect of locational licensing is t o  
reduce promoter's  mobility in a market within a metrop olitan area . 3 
As a result , promoters in neighbor ing cit ies are insulated s omewhat 
fr om experienced c ompetit ion that is likely to balk at spending 
another $200 t o  attempt one r isky show in a marke t in which another 
promoter is established . Statewide trans itory licenses are availab le 
f or a c lub that seeks t o  put on shows in any city under 100 ,000 in 
population , but these are of little help because these cities are 
3 According t o  Bus ine ss Regulation 27 2 of the CAC ,  except f or a 
transient license as pr ovided in Section 2 70 ,  no pr omoter or 
group of promoters shall direct ly or indirectly hold more than 
one club license without the consent of the Commis s ion . 
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unlike ly to be pr of itab le markets . 
Promoters might bypas s  the expense of a new license by hiring 
a locally-licensed promoter t o  act as a front . Managers ,  t oo, can 
f ind ways t o  avoid licensing . Of c ourse,  this is contrary to the 
spirit of licens ing , which is intended to keep managers ,  promoters and 
their backers public and under the s crut iny of the s tate . 
Neverthe le s s ,  in s ome cases licensed California pr omoters have acted 
as fronts f or f inancial backers . These latter indiv iduals pr obably 
prefer t o  avoid publicity or public f inancial dis c losure,  rather than 
the $200 licensing fee, s imply because the fee t o  the front is 
unlikely t o  be les s  than the license fee . In other cases , a promoter 
may be ine xperienced in boxing or in the local market ,  and therefore 
seeks a know ledgeable local pr omoter to assis t  in putting on a show.  
If locat ional licenses do restrict promoter mob ility , and 
thereby reduce c ompetit ion , one might expect t o  obs erve a stab ility in 
market shares across time . Time series data are presented in Table 7 
on the market shares of the largest California boxing pr omoting 
organizations in f our of the state' s maj or S tandard Metropolitan 
S tatistical Areas .4 The number of pr omoters in each market is shown 
in Tab le 8 .  Through out the 1960s and 197 0 s ,  pr omoters licensed t o  
arenas in Los Ange le s  never attempted shows in San Diego, Ventura, 
Santa Barbara, or Bakersf ield, and rarely in more than one p lace in 
the Los Angeles metropolitan area . This suggest s that locational 
4 San D iego is e xc luded because we were unable to distinguish
the two firms recorded on C ommis s ion monthly show summarie s .  
32 
TABLE 7 
MARKET SHARES OF LARGEST PROMOTING FIR MS 
Share by Year 
Market 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Los Angeles- .92 .94 .60 .47 .52 .40 .73 .64 .61 .58 .43 .49 
Long Beach 
San Francisco- .47 .37 .29 .34 .88 • 96 .42 .69 .60 .53 1.00 .70 1.00 
Oak l and 
Sacramento .82 .52 1.00 .82 .59 .49 .51 1.00 .96 .86 1.00 .90 1.00 
Stoc k ton 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .43 .89 .so .67 .86 .80 • 69 1.00
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licensing , particularly in Southern California , has limited promoter 
mobility and therefore co ntributed to both the sparcity of contests in 
surrounding cities and the market stability of estab lished f irms . 
Whether site-specific licenses reduce competition cannot be 
decisive ly prove n with the data at hand .  Neverthele s s ,  the practice 
has no logical advantage ,  and o ne like ly disadvantage--co nstraints to 
competition. The argume nt given for site-specific lice nses is that 
inspectio n of arenas is deemed desirab le before a f ight , so that the 
CAC must know the promoter' s location. But this could easily be 
handled by a simple requirement that promoters inform the Commis sio n 
about the sites of upcoming bouts a nd make the facilities availab le 
for pre-fight inspection. Or, the Commission could certify arena s ,  
much as the s tate inspects food establishme nts ,  for suitability for 
bo xing , without r elating this process to promoters . I n  a ny cas e ,  the 
s o le criteria for permitting a site to be used for bo xing should be 
health , safety , a nd s ecurity--not the eco nomic impact on o ther site s ,  
clubs , promoters , a nd matche s .  
Another effect o f  lice nsing i s  that the e ntire s e t  of 
Co mmissio n  licensing procedures tends to reinforce anticompetitive 
attitudes ,  norms a nd behavior amo ng Commissio n s taff a nd promo ters . 
Two examples i llus trate this point: the Co mmis sio n' s  former policy o n  
overpriced show s ,  and the adminis trative hearing give n to a ny protest,  
regardless  of grounds , to new c lub licenses . The Commis sion' s  po licy 
on overpriced shows limited the number of professional bo xing co ntests 
o n  the same night in the Los Angeles or San Francisco metropolitan
area (with minimum ringside prices of $10) . The po licy was 
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discontinued in 1 97 6  whe n it became evident that it may vio late the 
federal antitrust laws . 
The po licy of co nsidering protest s  by established licensees 
before approving a new club lice nse e ncourages anticompetitive 
behavior by firms a nd delays approval of license applications by 
forcing the Co mmissio n  to deliberate about biased a nd usually 
irrelevant informatio n. 5 
One example of a written protest recorded i n  Commis sion 
minutes co nsists in its e ntirety of the sentence : "I would like to 
protest the is sua nce of a bo xing license to Doy le Millcap . "  Another 
s tates: "I hereby protest the wrestling license of Valente Perez to 
promote wrestling at the Sports Arena . "  While Commission minutes do 
not reveal that new clubs or o ther participant s  were de nied licenses 
because of protests by competitors , neither do Commis sio n records 
indicate how many license applications might have been withdrawn 
before a hearing because of the delay in the proceedings or the 
unwillingness  to deal with these kinds of issues . Through interviews 
we discovered o ne case in which a potential licensee c laimed he was 
sufficiently discouraged by personal financial disclo sure ,  
administrative red tape,  a nd other Commissio n  procedures that he 
withdr ew his club license application. 
5 Rule 27 1 ,  Protest to C lub App licatio ns ,  states that written
protests may be filed with the Co mmis sio n  within ten days of the 
mailings of a bulletin carrying notificatio n of new licensee s .  
The Co mmissio n  may s chedule a hearing o n  the applicatio n  after 
ten days'  notice to a l l  interested partie s .  O n  the bas is o f  our 
March 1 97 9  report to the CAC o n  the effects of boxing 
regulation, the CAC has significant ly narrowed the grounds for 
protesting the e ntry of a new promoter .  
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TABLE 8 
NUMBE R OF PROFESSIONAL BOXING CLUBS STAGING EVENTS IN CALIFORNIA MARKETS* 
Markets defined 
'"' SMSA* 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
L.A. - Lon� Beach 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 2 3 5 5 3 4 
San Francisco -
Oakland 0 5 6 4 4 2 3 1 3 4 4 2 2 1 
San Jos e  2 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 0 
Sacramento 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 
Stockton 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 
Fresno 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 
San D ie�o 0 1 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Rivers ide - San 
Bernardino - Ontario 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Bakersfie ld 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Santa Barbara - Santa 
Maria - Lomnoc 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anaheim - Santa Ana -
Garden Grove 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Vallejo - Fairfie ld -
Napa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oxnard - Simi -
Ventura 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode s to 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Santa Rosa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Santa Cruz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
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A f inal anticompet itive effect associated with both licens ing 
of shows and promoters , but seldom mentioned in regulatory rev iew , 
involves the s tate' s r ole as an informat ion-gather ing entity. New 
license not if icat ions , and advance notices of match plans , as part of 
the public record, can inf orm established c lubs of the intent of a new 
market entrant well in advance of any show .  Thus , established 
licensees are g iven p lenty of t ime t o  mus ter econ omic , p olitical and 
other res ources t o  pr otect their bus iness . The small number of c lubs 
and arenas operating in boxing markets makes s trateg ic behavior 
p ossib le .  F or example , one Northern California promoter allegedly 
booked the only arena in t own and then cancelled his reservations t o  
keep a new competitor off balance . A Southern California boxing 
promoter greeted a new c ompet it or with a c ompet ing free show with free 
h ot dogs . F inally ,  in a Nor thern Calif ornia city , two managers , 
p lanning t o  arrange a card pr omoted by a new entrant , were warned by a 
competing pr omoter well in advance of the show not t o  appear . One 
manager subsequently cla imed he was assaulted . In effect , the state 
serves an inf ormation-gathering function f or the established promoters 
which is used to prevent c ompet it ive entry. While all of the 
activ it ies listed above are pr obab ly illegal,  costs  of litigation, 
c oupled with the relatively small economic s take s in boxing , make a 
c iv il legal r emedy unattract ive . Thus ,  the C ommis s ion w illy-nilly is 
making largely unpunishable antic ompetit ive act ions easier t o  
undertake . 
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CONTEST APPROVAL 
In addition t o  licensing participant s ,  the Athletic Commis sion 
plays an active role in boxing by regulating the c omposition of a 
boxing card . In effect the Commis s ion licenses and superv ises every 
show.  It select s referees and other off icials , and pas ses judgment on 
the appropriateness of every match . The purposes of c ontest and 
matchmaking regulation are alleged ly :  ( 1 )  t o  protect the boxers from 
b od ily harm that could result from a mismatch or pr olonged pummeling ; 
( 2 )  t o  prevent boxers fr om f ight ing with phys ical disabilities or 
injuries ; and (3)  t o  protect the public from fraud with respect t o  
mismatches ,  fixed f ights ,  or c ontests ending in quick KOs .6 Because
the C ommis s ion s taff does not keep quant itative records on contest 
disapproval, 7 we will rely on s tatements by C onnnis s ion per s onnel t o
determine the magnitude of the s tate' s r ole . 
J oe Olmos , inspector in Southern California, s tated that while 
he rarely rejected preliminary matches pr oposed by qualif ied 
matchmakers ,  he has requested that pr omoters reduce the number of 
rounds of a b out t o  protect an inexperienced or p oorly-c onditioned 
f ighter . He added that he has on occas ion r ejected main event 
contest s .  F ormer Ass is tant Executive Director Roy Tennis on stated 
that he often disappr oved matches suggested by pr omoters or 
6 When evaluating the current system ,  it should be noted that
California' s safety record is e xcellent . There have been f our 
deaths resulting from profess ional boxing matches in California 
over the las t  twenty year s .  Tw o  f ighters have also d ied in 
training . This compares t o  e ight boxing fata l ities throughout 
the w or ld in 1 97 8 . 
7 We have attempted t o  gather this data, but t o  no avail.
matchmakers in Northern California. In some cases he suggested 
opponents when the promoter or matchmaker had exhausted his ideas. 
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One industry spokesman believes that these decisions reflected concern 
for the safety of fighters . The scarcity of events ,  the shortage of 
talented or skilled bo xers in Northern California , and the 
inexperience of some Northern Cal ifornia promoters also contributed to 
the disapproval of bouts . Without empirical evidence to support these 
qual itative s tatements ,  we can only conclude that contest approval or 
the selection of a permissible subset of bo xer combinations for each 
weight class is a major regulatory activity . To the extent that 
Commis sion approval of contests restricted the supply of bo xer 
combinations in Northern Cal ifornia, it raises the purses of some 
fighters ,  lowers the purses of others , and generally increases the 
cost of s taging f ights by enhancing the bargaining position of 
fighters who are approved by the regulators . 
There are two relevant questions related to the regulation of 
contes t approval : ( 1 )  Is it necessary to protect the bo xers from 
themselves and the public from fraud? ( 2 )  Is admini strative contest 
approval the most effective way t o  accomplish the desired level of 
protection? 
In the absence of government regulation, matchmaking would 
depend on negotiations between boxers (or their managers ) and 
promoters ( or their matchmakers ) .  Assuming a manager maximizes the 
present value of the future e xpected earnings of his f ighters over the 
duration of their contract s ,  managers are unlikely to agree to a f ight 
in which the probability is  high that a young fighter will be bad ly 
39 
beaten, injured , or even lo s e ,  because these event s woul d  reduce the 
value of the bo xer . However , perverse incentives might exist for a 
manager to overmatch the fighter as a fighter ages , his lack of talent 
beomes apparent , his contract approaches expiration, or he 
contemplates switching to another manager. Moreover , a manager might 
make a poor match for one of his fighters in order to secure an 
exceptional payday for another . Of course,  these incentives lead to 
an inefficient outcome only if someone besides the bo xer po ssesses the 
best information about the risks of a match, as can easily be inferred 
from Oi' s analysis of product safety . 
From the promoter' s angle,  in a free market with many managers 
and promoter s ,  matchmakers usually have incentives not to agree to a 
mismatch or fixed f ight because this might anger fans or sacrifice 
future ticket sale s .  This would create a conflict of interest between 
managers who prefer easy victories for their young f ighters and 
promoter s who desire to attract fight fans with competitive bout s .  
The free market outcome will depend o n  the attitudes of fight fans 
about mismatches .  One might expect balanced ,  competitive cards to 
emerge from such a system, even when a manager faces pervers e 
incentives .  
In two si tuations the conf lict o f  interest between managers 
and promoters may disappear, upsetting the competitivenes s  of bouts 
and ne cessitating oversight of contest approva l .  Firs t ,  if a promoter 
only puts on one show and then goes out of busines s ,  the danger of 
mismatches or fraud increase s .  Thus , there would b e  a role for the 
state to prevent the occasional charlatan. According to one bo xing 
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s ource , phony boxers have been promoted in Calif ornia and other states 
despite regulation. Moreover , many promoters over the years have 
purchased licenses only to promote one show.  
A second case in which government supervision of contest 
approval might be necessary to protect the boxer occurs when a 
permanent boxing cluster creates a common interest between a pr omoter 
and manager in building up a young , talented fighter . As noted 
earlier , b oxing is entertainment , and creating a "star" pays 
dividends . Thus , s ome slightly unbalanced matches f or a fighter in 
one year, accompanied by s omewhat l ower revenues than more competitive 
fights would bring , may create a very popular fighter f or outstanding 
gates next year . However , the development of a young f ighter might 
create dangers f or the eager, s ometimes older fighters who are used as 
opponents . These f ighters might have a tendency t o  f ight too often 
and out of their clas s ,  taking the small chance of a big win against a 
better fighter . As a resul t ,  the state might have a role t o  protect 
these eager fighters from themselve s .  
The revenue f oregone while developing a fighter will depend on 
the tastes of fight fans . If fans like to see quick knockouts and 
one-sided mauling s ,  the cost of mismatches in l os s  of ticket sales 
might be minimal .  To gain information on the matchmaking incentives 
created by the preferences of fight fans we used regression techni ques 
to estimate the reduced f orm demand f or boxing and boxers in 
Sacramento during 1 972-76 . Sacrament o  was selected because we were 
able to obtain detailed information on the characteris tics of fighters 
in the main events .  
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Table 9 contains the results of a statis tical analysis of the 
effect of a set of main event f ight parameters on attendance at boxing 
events ,  real revenue , and boxers' purse s .  The reported equation is 
linear in the l ogarithms of all the variables e xcept the dummy 
variables that were used to denote the race of the fighters and fights 
involving Pete Ranzany when he was a champion. A linear version of 
the e quation yielded es sentially the same qualitative results , but 
f ewer statistically significant regression coefficients and l ower 
-2 values of R • 
The f irst two col umns in Table 9 are demand e quations f or 
fights . Price data were not available , s o  separate estimations were 
undertaken with attendance and gate receipts in real dollars as the 
dependent variable.  Ideally, an attendance equation with price as an 
independent variable would be preferred . As it is , these two 
equations must be used t ogether t o  measure fan interes t .  The third 
equation estimates the determinants of the size of the purse f or the 
main event fighters . Because the demand f or b oxers is derived from 
the demand among fans f or b oxing matches , the e quations should differ 
very little if factor markets are c ompetitive and promoters are 
rational in negotiating purse s .  The slightly lower explanatory power 
of the real revenue e quation is expected because s ome fan interest is  
attributable t o  other f ights on the card , and , in any cas e ,  greater 
random errors can be e xpected in realized sales than in contract 
negotiations . Coefficients in the revenue e quation should generally 
be nearer zero than in the purse equation because other fights on the 
card will affect only the f ormer . Except f or the Ranzany dummy , 
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TABLE 9 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF BOXING EVENTS IN SACRAMENTO , 1972-76 
Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
(Main Event) Attendance Real Revenue 
RACE 
- . 20 - . 27 
(1. 73) (2.22) 
BUILDUP * . 22 .28 (2. 73) (3.24) 
RANZANY 76 . 39 .73 (1 . 94) (3 .46) 
STYLE * -.15 - . 21 (.88) (1 . 15) 
MAT CH * . 11 .12 (1. 67) (1. 77) 
ADS * .24 .30 
(2.00) (2.43) 
CONSTANT 5.29 6.03 
R2 .39 .55 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 37 37 
* - Variables expressed as natural logarithms 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* 
Real Purse 
For Main Event 
-.33 
(2.90) 
.34 
(4.13) 
.55 
(2. 77) 
-.63 
(3.89) 
• 28 
(4. 38) 
6.11 
.64 
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Definitions of Variables : RACE takes the value one if both main event 
fighters were of the same ethnic background (black, hispanic or 
white) and zero other wise ;  B UILDUP is the number of matches by both 
fighters in Sacramento during the preceding t welve months ; 
RANZANY 76 takes the value of one for matches involving Pete 
Ranzany in 1976 when he was champion; STYLE is the sum of the 
percentages of past bouts won by a knockout by the t wo fighter s ;  
MATCH i s  the sum of net victories of the t wo fighters ; and ADS is 
the number of inches of advertising in local ne wspapers promoting 
the match. 
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this is always the case, and RANZANY 76 may be explained by the fact 
that Ranzany's manager was, in effect,  also the promoter of his 
fights ,  so his purse was hardly the outcome of an arm' s-length 
negotiation. 
The regression results provide a means for testing several of 
the hypotheses about the operation of the bo xing industry and the 
conceptual basis for regulating it . The attendance and revenue 
equations are consistent with the hypothesis about the importance of 
buildup . The coefficients ( elasticities ) on prior f ights in the area 
and the records of the fighters sho w a linkage bet ween the 
attractivene ss of a f ight and the history of the f ighters,  but both 
elasticities are less than unity, indicating diminishing returns to a 
string of victories at the local club against relatively weak 
opponents .  For a good fighter, a match against another good fighter 
will be worth the risk eventually, but probably not at the beginning . 
For a fighter who is not as good, the coefficients for BUILDUP and 
MATCH indicate little incentive for a s tring of weak local fights,  
some of which are lo sses,  so that risky matches against good fighters 
are more attractive to mediocre boxers than to good ones . Hence, the 
buildup process has attractions for both winners and lo sers . 
The purse and revenue e quations are very similar, as they 
should be if the industry is operated rationally. The ratio of the 
coefficients on the same variable in the purse and revenue equations 
differs the mo st for percent knockouts and net wins . For MATCH, this 
indicates that an established f ighter with a large number of net wins 
seems to earn proportionately larger purses in relation to his effect 
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on gate receipts .  This is cons istent with the hypothesis that the 
best f ighters sell their services in es sentially competitive national 
and regional markets , whereas fighters early in their careers or with 
mediocre records operate primarily in the l ocal market ,  which has very 
few promoters who, theref ore,  may be able to e xtract s ome rent s .  With 
respect to STYLE , the difference between the purse and revenue 
e quations has no ready e xplanation; however , the negative c oefficient 
in all three e quations--although significant only in the purse 
equation--seems t o  indicate that the more dangerous matches generate 
less interest.  
Several other variables were tried that would reveal a 
preference f or certain kinds of mismatches : creating two variables 
f or net wins , the f irst being the number f or the f ighter with the 
greater net wins; entering knockout percentages in a similar fashion; 
us ing products and higher powers of these variables and of STYLE and 
MATCH as defined in Table 9 .  In all cases,  n o  evidence c ould b e  f ound 
f or a demand f or mismatches or even mi xed b oxing s tyles , nor were 
there any payoffs in terms of statis tically significant gains from the 
more complicated specifications . 
These results weaken, but do not eliminate, the case f or 
regulation. While the evidence against a taste f or one-sided fights 
is a point against the need f or regulation,  it does not rule out 
matchmaking mistakes through informational imperfections in the 
market .  The importance of buildup and, theref ore,  of clusters also is 
consistent with the argument f or regulation. As argued above , the 
presence of clusters , the concentration of income in the hands of a 
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tiny portion of b oxer s ,  and the importance of buildup in generating 
fan interest create incentives f or boxers below the top rung and their 
managers to accept risky matches .  Given that a misinformed judgment 
in this industry can cost a life or end in permanent injury , a state 
role in contest supervision may be justified. But the present system, 
based on personal judgment , unencumbered by due pr oce s s ,  and freed of 
possibility of appeal , creates opportunities f or abuse .  And ,  the 
domination of a few promoters and managers could be aided by 
differences in the extent to which proposed cards are scrutinized . 
Although we have no evidence that contest approval is consciously used 
t o  limit c ompetition ,  we would be surprised if a card proposed by a 
succes sful , trustworthy pr omoter with a l ong hist ory of deal ing with 
the C onnnission would be s crutinized with the same care as a proposal 
involving unknown pr omoters , managers , and f ighters . If this tendency 
is in operation,  the result is a barrier to c ompetition. 
What ,  then, are the alternatives ?  The key regulatory role , if 
the argument f or any intervention is accepted , is to provide 
information about boxers and to establish boundaries on the skill 
differences between b oxers who are matched against each other. One 
possibility is f or boxers t o  be classified by quality ,  based on 
experience , by referee s ,  officials , and Connnission s taff after each 
f ight . Matchmakers would be allowed t o  match b oxers within a certain 
range of clas sifications without Connnission approval , or t o  f ile a 
request at the Commis sion, with suppor ting evidence , to match out side 
of the allowed range of quality. New boxers w ould request 
classif icat ion when initial ly licensed in Cal if ornia, and would be 
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classified according to their records as amateurs or as profess ionals 
in other s tates . Any boxer dissatisf ied with his rating could appeal 
to the Connnission , presenting evidence to support a chang e .8 
The advantages of such a system are twofold: ( 1 )  it keeps the 
Connnission out of reviewing mos t matches , thereby minimizing the 
pos sibility for anticompetitive or otherwise undesirable consequences 
of dis charging this responsiblity; and ( 2 ) it brings the process of 
Commission supervision of matches--and the rankings that are already 
implicit in these decisions--into the light for public scrutiny and 
pos sible appeal . 
With respect to other Commis sion l icensing activities , we are 
sympathetic to the desire to maintain the integrity of the sport by 
supervis ing all employees of promoters and arena s ,  including referees ,  
officials , and timekeeper s .  We suspect ,  though , that this is 
regulatory overkil l .  If the Commis sion retains the right t o  bar or to 
suspend people from par ticipating in the sport in any capacity, based 
upon evidence concerning past activities and subject to public review ,  
the sport should b e  safeguarded. All sports depend on honest 
off iciating , and all face the temptation of gambling interests to 
8 For example, boxers could be given a rating of 1 through 1 0 ,
with 1 reserved for boxers with minimal ability and 1 0  accorded 
to f ighters with national rankings .  Promoters could then match 
without prior approval two boxers in the same weight clas s whose 
ratings were within two categories of each other , e . g .  a "6" 
could fight anyone between "4" and "8 . 11 The range could be 
adjusted for matches across weight classes,  e . g .  an "8" 
welterweight could fight no better than a 119" middleweight and 
no worse than a "7" lightweight , but might be allowed to fight 
as low as a 11511 middleweight .  The Connnission could retain 
discretionary powers to l imit the number of rounds of 
preliminary fights . 
tamper with outcomes .  Yet other sports survive nicely without 
licensing everyone from the referee to the ticket taker.  The 
Connnission should retain its inves tigatory powers and should watch 
performances closely , but we see no reason to do mor e .  
CONTRACT TERMS 
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The third major regulatory activity of the Commission involves 
writing and enforcing contracts between the various boxing 
participants .  Currently the CAC limits the duration of a contract 
between a boxer and a manager to f ive year s ,  and sets a maximum of 
one-third of the purse as the manager' s fee for his service s .  
The rationale for Connnission rules regar ding contracts is  to 
protect boxers from managers and promoters . Pres umably a boxer , at 
least at the beginning of a career , has less information about 
contracting policies and boxer earnings than the others . The rules 
are argued to produce better terms for boxers than would otherwise 
occur . In this milieu , contract rules like those in force change the 
information available to the boxer . In effect , they estab lish a 
"government seal of approval" for the "fairness" of the worst legal 
outcome for the boxer . Whether the issue is contract rules , 
price/wage controls ,  or other forms of government economic controls , 
the effect of imposing a floor or ceiling to a negotiation involving 
parties with differing information is , if anything , likely to be to 
drive the result to the legal limit of the more informed party. 
In a competitive market with perfect information, purse-
sharing arrangements should differ among boxers .  Managers would be 
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willing to accept a lower share of purses for the young boxers who 
have the most promise because of their higher expected earnings and , 
possib ly,  the lesser effort of the manager that is required in 
arranging matches and teaching skills . Regulation might truncate this 
distribution of outcome from above . But with imperfect information, 
regulation may truncate both tails of the distribution by making the 
maximum legal share for the manager a focal point in nego tiations 
between managers and boxers . 9 In all likel ihood ,  this focal point , 
plus uninformed boxers , explains why all managers except one 
negotiated the maximum one-third income-sharing arrangement . Because 
the talent , career l ifetime , and earnings potential of boxers vary 
widely , it is unlikely that laissez-faire negotiations between boxers 
and managers would result in all managers receiving precisely one-
third of a f ighter' s l ifetime earnings .  As a resul t ,  we conclude that 
the prescribed wording of contracts probably has increased the 
earnings of managers at the expense of boxers . 
Another Connnission policy, pushed by the Managers and Coaches 
Association, extended the maximum l ifetime of boxers ' s  contract from 
three to f ive year s .  The f ive-year maximum has also acted a s  a focal 
point to encourage boxers to sign contracts for the maximum period . 
After the Connnis sion ruling , a number of California managers refused 
to sign boxers for less than f ive years . 
9 The CAC-approved form for a boxer-manager contract reads : " 2 .
After the deduction o f  a l l  training and transportation expenses 
that may be incurred by the athlete in the performance of his 
duties hereunder, the manager agrees to take only 33 1/3 % of 
all sums of money earned by the athlete from any services that 
the said connnission has rendered or may render hereunder • • • • " 
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One final example illustrates the Connnission' s unintentional 
role of restraint of trade in contract negotiations . Rule 292 states 
that no club , without written and final approval of the Connnis sion, 
can pay more than 60 percent of the gate receipt s ,  with state tax 
deducted, to either boxing contestant . While the effectiveness of 
this rule is somewhat in doubt , there is  no way of knowing how many 
promoters over the last decade might have cited it during negotiations 
with managers .  Furthermore, it makes a public is sue out of private 
negotiations . Why should Connnission rules restrain the earnings of a 
valuable f ighter? 
If regulators seek to protect boxers , the best they can do is 
the following : ( 1 )  Adopt a s tandard form of contract between boxers 
and manager s ,  and between boxers/managers and promoters , that contains 
clearly worded clauses dealing with all the issues connnon to such 
negotiations but leaving blanks where sharing arrangements and 
reimbursements are to be entered . ( 2 )  Periodically provide every 
manager and boxer information on the range and average values 
negotiated for each of the blanks , e . g .  the 25th , SOth, and 7 5 th 
percentile for the duration of a manager' s contract , the standard 
purse-sharing arrangement , the typical purse for a preliminary fighter 
of a given experience and ability , etc . In instances in which boxers 
cannot read or are o therwise not able to digest such information, as 
can be determined at medical inspections , the Commis sion could appoint 
a special aide to assist the boxer in executing a contract . 
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OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISS ION 
We complete our study of boxing regulation with a short 
discussion of the influence of a career bureaucracy and a political 
commis sion on the indus try . Regulatory commissions sometimes display 
evidence of "regulatory - capture" by the industries that they regulate.  
Capture means that the Commission becomes a promoter and protector of 
the industry. The licensing policies , contract involvement , and 
contest approval of the Commission all exempl ify these roles.  Our 
s tudy revealed that Commis sion staff quickly develop close working 
relationships and even friendships with managers and promoters . This 
is not surprising , because the economically significant part of the 
industry can be narrowed to a handful of boxer s ,  managers , and 
promoter s .  In addition, referees' and managers' as sociations designed 
to protect the interests of their members are well organized, whereas 
fans and boxers are not .  These as sociations persistently lobby the 
Commission for rules they favor , perhaps to the detriment of other 
participants ,  and they often succeed . 
It is natural for Commission members and s taff to be concerned 
about the economic health of boxing . After all,  by choosing to become 
associated with the Commis sion, these people show an atypical interest 
in the spor t ,  and can be expected to want it to flourish. But this 
can be dangerous , as benevolent interest slides easily into 
anticompetitive protectionism. And s everal people whom we interviewed 
believe that the Commis sion has stepped over this f ine l ine . We were 
able to obtain a notarized, sworn affidavit from a licensed California 
promoter . It states that the CAC s taf f intervened to prevent 
51  
competi tive bidding among promoters for a major fight , and reflects 
attitudes and conduct described by o ther sources who were not wil ling 
to be named .lo It deals with the f ight with the larges t  gros s  in the 
history of boxing in California, Ranzany vs . Cuevas .  We are not 
lawyer s ,  so we have no way of evaluating the legal implications of 
this information. We do see,  however , a persistent pattern in 
Commis sion activities to engage in anticompetitive practices in an 
industry that already faces severe limits to compe tition in any case.  
History tells us that regulation persistently exhibits much 
the same tendency evident in the California Athletic Commis sion. 1 1  If 
regulation of some aspects of boxing is a social neces sity, 
insti tutional protections must be carefully constructed to minimize 
its anticompetitive effects . In general,  the guidelines should be : 
( 1 )  to minimize the extent of "informal" regulation outside of public 
scrutiny ( e . g .  informal supervision of matchmaking ) ;  ( 2 )  to keep the 
domain of regulation to a clearly defined minimum, in this case a set 
of specif ic aspect s of boxer protection ; and (3)  wherever pos sible,  to 
use informational strategies and general rules that are enforced 
through ex po st punishment s ,  rather than case-by-case decisions in 
which normal business practices must be approved by the Commission in 
advance . 
lO The affidavit is included in our second report to the CAC,
"Regulation of Boxing in Cal ifornia . "  
1 1  The capture theory was originally expl icated by Bernstein.
Regulation as the outcome of interest-group politics is explored 
more fully in No l l ,  Peltzman and S tigler , among others.  
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